Some speech acts can be performed – that is, without hiccups – while being less happy. I promise to meet tomorrow for lunch, but I have not the slightest intention of doing good. Here I promised everything in order, but the act is not happy because it is not sincere. My action is, more precisely, an abuse, because although it is an act of speech, it does not conform to an appropriate standard for speech acts of this kind. Sincerity is a paradigmatic condition for the bliss of acts of speech. Austin planned a research program that would examine in detail thousands of types of speech acts, elucidating the conditions of happiness for all.  Hare 1989 responds that there could be a society with a convention that the utterance of a particular expression represents the performance of a particular illocutionary act, even those that occur on stage or are used by jokers or storytellers. Green 1997 questions the relevance of this observation in relation to the assertion which, as we have seen, seems to require intentions for its execution. Just as no convention could argue that I believe P, no convention could argue that I intend to present a particular sentence as a statement. Here, the speaker wants to know whether milk has been purchased or not. However, you used a declarative sentence and not a set of questions. There is no direct relationship between sentence type and function, so this is an example of indirect language.
Although Pratt sees this remark as a critique of the theory of the act of speech, it also suggests a way in which this theory might illuminate subtle forms of oppression. We saw in section 2.2 that a supposed bet can fail if it is not accepted. In such a case, the speaker tries to bet, but fails in this effort due to lack of audience acceptance. Thus, a person may also not be in the right social position to excommunicate or name, for example, and his attempts to perform such illocutions will fail. More importantly, a pattern of abuse of speech institutions could deprive a person of the ability to perform speech acts: the inveterate promise-breaker will, over time, lead other members of his community to unwilling to accept the promises he is trying to make. He can perform countless locutionary actions, but will not be able to carry out the illocutionary act of promise, at least in this community. In the philosophy of language and linguistics, the act of speech is something expressed by an individual who not only presents information, but also performs an action.  For example, the phrase “I want kimchi, could you pass it on to me?” is considered an act of speech because it expresses the speaker`s desire to acquire kimchi as well as an invitation to someone to pass on kimchi. According to Kent Bach, “Almost every act of speech is really the execution of several acts at once, which differ in different aspects of the speaker`s intention: there is the act of saying something you do when you say it, such as asking or promising, and how to try to influence your audience.
 The contemporary use of the term goes back to J. L. Austin`s development of performative utterances and his theory of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary actions. Speech acts perform their function as soon as they are said or communicated. This often includes actions such as apologies, promises, orders, responses, requests, complaints, warnings, invite, refuse and praise.  While an act of speech is an act of pronunciation of meaningful words, “act of speech” is an art concept. As a first approximation, speech acts are actions that can (but should not) be performed by saying that one does. According to this conception, resignation, promises, affirmations and questions are all acts of speech, while convincing, insulting and growing six inches are not. For example, you can resign by saying, “I`m resigning…” “, although you can also take a step back from a position without calling yourself that.
However, this conception is too inclusive, as it also counts whispering as an act of speech, although one can whisper a series of absurd words without meaning anything. Instead, a more precise characterization of speech acts relies on Grice`s notion of speaker`s meaning. This term is discussed in section 5 below, but for now, just note that looking at my watch, I could try to figure out the time; Or I could try to show you that it`s time for us to leave. The latter (but not the former) is an important case for the speaker. According to Austin and Searle, there are three main acts related to speech acts: locutionary act, illocutionary act, and what? In linguistics, a speech act is a statement defined in terms of a speaker`s intention and the effect it has on a listener. Essentially, it is the action that the speaker hopes to provoke in his audience. Acts of speech can be requests, warnings, promises, apologies, greetings or a number of statements. As you can imagine, speech acts are an important part of communication.
Austin called these speech targets acts of perlocutions (1962, p. 101). I can both urge and persuade you to close the door, but the former is an illocution, while the latter is a pearl. How can we make a difference? We can do this by seeing that, under the right conditions, you can simply push and say, “I hereby ask you to close the door,” when there is no circumstance in which I can convince you by simply saying, “I hereby convince you to close the door.” A characteristic purpose of the exhortation, however, is the elaboration of a decision to act (1962, p. 107). Cohen (1973) develops the idea of perlocutions as characteristic targets of speech acts. The failures of bliss fall into two classes: failures and abuses. The former are cases in which the alleged act of speech is not carried out at all. When I say to QEII, “I declare this ship Noam Chomsky,” I didn`t name anything because I don`t have the authority to do so.
So my action goes wrong by performing an act of speech, but not an act of speech. Other speech attempts may fail because their recipient does not respond with adequate greet: I cannot bet $100 on who will win the election unless you accept that bet. If you do not accept this bet, then I tried to bet, but I did not manage to bet. As discussed in section 9, a systematic reluctance on the part of a speaker`s interlocutors to respond with the necessary acceptance may affect that speaker`s freedom of speech. The following sentence is an example of Searle`s 5 types of speech acts: “I declare you husband and wife now.” Much of the literature dealing with speech acts is strangely separated from natural language semantics research, which focuses on pragmatic factors. For example, Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974), Lewis (1979, 1980), Thomason (1990) and others have developed conversational kinematics models aimed at understanding the role of quantification, presupposition (semantic and pragmatic), anaphora, deixis and imprecision in discourse. These patterns typically interpret conversations to include an ever-changing set of sentences that can be assumed by interlocutors. This set of propositions is the conversational commonality, defined as the set of statements that all interlocutors believe to be true, while assuming that all other interlocutors believe them to be true. If a sentence p is in the common ground of a conversation, then a speaker can readily assume the truth of p.
Let us suppose, then, that the claim that Singapore has a single king rests at some point on the common basis of a conversation; Then, a speaker can happily utter a phrase like “The current King of Singapore is wise” or “The King of Singapore sleeps.” .